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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people,
mediated by images...The spectacle, grasped in its totality, is both the result and
the proj ect of the existing mode of production. It is not a supplement to the real
world, an additional decoration. It is the heart of the unrealism of the real society.
In all its specific forms, as information or propaganda, as advertisement or direct
entertainment consumption, the spectacle is the present model of socially
dominant life.
Guy Debord (1967), Society o/the Spectacle: Theses 4,6.
This project investigates how iconic images from the Beijing Olympics-e.g.,
logos, venues, and scenes from the Opening and Closing ceremonies-form a visual
narrative in which Chinese history and identity are configured to meet the political
economic goals of the Central Communist Party. I draw on semiotics and discourse
analysis to suggest projected national images (Wang 2003) that are embedded within
visual data collected primarily from the Beijing2008 website. Furthermore, I apply
current theories in identity politics to these visual data to problematize the social
construction of what the nation branding literature refers to as "brand China." I argue
that the symbolic and emotive content of the visual imagery from the Beijing Olympics
attempted to position China as a non-threatening, legitimate power in the Western
cultural imaginary. Ultimately, I argue that the Party's lack of political credibility
challenges the potential success of its Olympic image building efforts.
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Limiting this discussion to "visual texts" produced directly by the Central
Communist Party (the Party) and the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic
Games (BOCOG) provides a narrative that is relatively unfettered by the ideological lens
of Western media. As the Party's Olympic marketing campaign is highly visual, it
provides a rich source of visual data from which to begin an understanding of the
image(s) that the Party projected to the international community during the Olympics.
Such projected national images comprise a visual narrative that includes graphics (such
as posters, emblems, and logos); mascots, advertisements, and merchandise; it manifests
in a variety of media, such as print, television, and digital; and it includes Olympic
venues and Olympic ceremonies, rituals, and games. By deconstructing this visual
narrative and its recurring themes I show how Chinese national identity and history are
configured to meet the political economic goals of the Party.
For the purposes of this project I consider the Party as the primary actor
responsible for the projected national images embedded within the visual narrative
surrounding the Beijing Olympics. Yet, it is inaccurate to consider the Party as a
monolithic block of uniform interests and objectives. Susan Brownell (2008) in
particular raises the important point that the Party's external "presentation of self," as it
were, belies the often contentious identity politics and competing interests that
characterize its internal reality, such as the politics between Beijing city leaders and
Central Party officials or between the Party and the disaffected artists who consulted on
the design of visual elements for the Beijing Olympics. With respect to image building
and nation branding during the Beijing Olympics, it is important to keep in mind that the
Party's internal political divisions necessitated an external projection of uniformity and
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harmony. In this sense, it is an unlikely coincidence that harmony and uniformity are
projected national images that clearly manifest in the Party's Olympic visual narrative, as
I show below. Nevertheless, there are a few instances from the Beijing Olympics in
which actors involved in the production of the images that comprise the visual data I
investigate in this project express their individual opinions about the Party or about the
Beijing Olympics. I include their comments and individual expressions because they
point to the complexity involved in the construction of projected national images such as
those that manifest during the Beijing Games. Lastly, the importance of recognizing that
the Party is not a uniform or harmonious block of interests points to future research that
could move beyond the focus on decontextualized images as representations of national
identity into the richer, more robust terrain of the actual on-the-ground processes
involved in the cultural production of knowledge and national identity.
While maintaining a critical stance towards my subject, I want to avoid reifYing
dubious, stereotyped "East - West" categories of cultural identity. Therefore, in addition
to making clear that my vantage point to the Beijing Olympics was mediated through
NBC and its 81. Louis and Chicago affiliates, I take steps to rely upon, whenever possible
and to the greatest extent, the Party's own images, words, and explanations-mainly
from the www.beijing2008.com website-and those of other ethnic Chinese involved in
the design of the elements that comprised the Party's Olympic visual narrative.
Framing the Party's Olympic imagery as a narrative that tells a story about "brand
China" lays a framework for a comparative analysis of how other host cities have used
the Olympics to engage in their own image building and nation branding work. Later, I
briefly discuss the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as they are often cited as one of the most
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successful examples of how the Olympics can positively transfonn a city and nation's
brand reputation (Kennet and de Moragas 2006). By comparing the unique historical and
political economic circumstances between Beijing and Barcelona, I emphasize the role of
idnentity politics in the social construction of brand China and the importance of political
credibility in achieving the Party's image building and political economic objectives.
Statement of the Problem
The problem I am addressing in this project concerns the social construction of
national identity-as-national brand image. Whereas there has been much scholarship
concerning the mechanics of how nation-states go about internally constructing national
identity as a category of cultural identity, relatively little social scientific research has
considered how actors-in this case, the Party state apparatus-construct national brand
images for external consumption. I argue that current theories from identity politics,
such as constructivism and instrumentalism, are potentially useful frameworks for
critically examining the place of class, history, and identity in the construction of China's
Olympic national brand image.
Research Questions
Ultimately, this project is a way for me to engage my interest in the challenges
China faces with regards to class, social justice, and identity construction. In the context
ofthe Beijing Olympics, my interests can be phrased as a series of questions: "How are
competing discourses about identity, class, and history resolved in the Party's visual
representation of brand China, a narrative constructed specifically for a non-Chinese,
external audience? How can theories from identity politics help problematize the social
construction of brand China? How do visual representations of Chinese national identity
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and history function in the Party's Olympic visual narrative? Put simply, what do we
learn about contemporary Chinese culture by looking at iconic images from the Beijing
Olympics? How is what we learn intended to build up China's external, international
image?
Research Goals
The fundamental goal of this project is to consider how the 2008 Beijing
Olympics provided Party leaders with a global platform for the construction and
representation of Chinese national identity-as-national brand image. In this way I hope to
make sense ofthe storm of controversy that surrounded the Beijing Olympics and to
identify some of the identity politics that fueled this debate. I believe that visual
representations of Chinese national identity-as-national brand images and the projected
national images embedded within the Party's Olympic visual narrative offer a unique
opportunity to consider "brand identity" as a category of socially constructed cultural
identity. In doing so I hope to better understand what is happening to history, class, and
identity in contemporary China. This project also points to the prominence of image,
representation, and visuality in postmodern societies-a fruitful avenue for future
research.
Literature Review
Recent theorists have made it possible to understand the central role of ideology
and power in the discursive production (Foucault 1977, 1980) of categories of cultural
identity such as ethnicity, gender, and nationalism. Competition between ideologies and
power relations gives rise to dominant and subordinate discourses through which political
and economic processes operate on the body to generate categories of cultural identity
6
(Escobar 1995, 1992; Ferguson 1994; Said 1979). As the dominant and subordinate
discourses are dynamic and constantly in flux, so too are categories of cultural identity;
that is, identity and meaning are symbolically constructed in everyday life interactions
and as such are flexible and context dependent (Bourdieu 1980; Melucci 1988; Comaroff
and Comaroff 1991; Volosinov 1986).
The theoretical trajectory outlined above has influenced constructivist theories of
identity politics and international relations. With respect to national identity,
constructivism is exemplified most famously by Anderson (1983), Habermas (1992), and
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). More recently, their problematization of national identity
has been fruitfully extended to examine nationalism in China (Brownell 2008; Callahan
2004; Zheng 1999). Constructivist theory is important to this project because it provides
a conceptual framework and a language to operationalize how a national brand such as
brand China is a socially constructed category of cultural identity.
In this project I also draw on instrumentalist theories from identity politics to
explain the pragmatic and rational character of the projected national images embedded
in the Party's Olympic visual narrative. Instrumentalism was heavily influenced by the
philosophical works of John Dewey (White 1943; Eldridge 1998). More recently,
Bates's (1983) application of instrumentalist theory to identity politics in contemporary
Africa revealed how identities are flexible and can be discursively reconfigured to suit
the political economic goals of cultural or political elites.
Maurice Roche's definition of a "mega-event" informs this project: mega-events
are "large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a
dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance" (2000: p.l).
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Additionally, Roberts highlights the ability of mega-events "to transmit promotional
messages to billions of people via television and other developments in
telecommunications" (2004: p. 108).
A growing number of social scientific studies recognize the cultural and political-
economic significance of staging mega-events (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006; Simson
and Jennings 1992; Tomlinson 2000). Of particular interest to this study are
investigations into the relationship between sports mega-events and national identity
(Brownell 1994, 2008; Pi-Sunyer 1995; Tomlinson and Young 2006; Xu 2006). Scholars
interested in the transnational sports-media industry and globalization (Maguire 1999)
have observed the fierce competition among cities to acquire the symbolic capital accrued
by hosting sports mega-events (Gaffakin and Morrissey 1999) and the profound socio-
spatial transformations to urban geography that characterize these competitions (Harvey
1989; Sassen 2001). It is in this way that competition among cities to host mega-events
is located within the "economy of appearances" (Carter 2006) and relates to Guy
Debord's neo-Marxist arguments about "spectacular accumulation" and the "society of
the spectacle." As Carter (2006: 152) explains, "The drama of 'spectacular accumulation'
essentially makes the city a commodity, bought and sold, torn down, speculated upon,
and fought over, in which "that which appears is good, that which is good appears"
(Debord 1995[1967]: 5)." Debord's ideas point to avenues of future research into the
role of image and representation in the cultural production of brand China and national
brand images in general. I return to this line of thinking in the conclusion.
Furthermore, Guy Debord's concern about the subordination of history, class,
and social justice to the prerogatives of the "economy of appearances" (its prerogative
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being, namely, spectacular accumulation) is echoed in the works of contemporary
scholars concerned about the unequal distribution of social benefits that a city gains by
staging sports mega-events (Horne 2007; Zhang and Silk 2006; Lowes 2002). A few
authors have applied a similar line of Debord's neo-Marxist theory to these areas of study
(Harvey 1989; Broudehoux 2004, 2007).
Nation branding is a commercial practice in which governments contract branding
consultants to help raise the international competitiveness of the country's products,
services, tourist destinations, cultural capital, political objectives, and overall image and
reputation (Olins 2002). In many respects nation branding is the application of brand
marketing to public diplomacy. An important distinction between nation branding and
traditional public diplomacy, however, is that while public diplomacy is explicitly
political in its aims, nation branding is explicitly commercial. Furthermore, "image
building" does not necessarily mean the same thing as nation branding. One can do
image building by doing public diplomacy or some other form of international public
relations but that does not mean one is doing nation branding. Nevertheless, nation
branding and image building share an overriding concern for the reputation and image of
the nation in question (or "client," in the case of nation branding). For this reason I use
the term image "work" to convey the general activities, tactics, and goals shared by
image building, nation branding, public relations, reputation management, public
diplomacy, and so forth.
Nation branding's growing appeal to politicians and government leaders signals to
some the conflation of political interests with commercial, market economics within
contemporary neoliberal international relations (Kunczik 1997). Van Ham (2001, 2008),
for instance, argues that the external focus of nation branding is transforming
international relations. Nation branding's focus on the external projection of national
images presents an alternative to the constructivist understanding that national identity is
constructed for internal solidarity and cohesion. In the "new brand world,"
Those states that successfully fictionalize themselves to others, rather than those
states that fictionalize themselves to themselves, will prevail. Old-style
nationalism, in which the focus was on telling stories internally (our history, our
bloodlines, our manifest destiny), will take a backseat to branding, telling you
story to others (What can we do for you? Where do you want to go
today?) .. .Image and reputation are thus becoming essential parts of the state's
strategic equity (Twitchell 2004: 293-294).
A few academics have explored specific nation branding campaigns in Latvia
(Dzenovska 2005), Iceland (Gudjonsson 2005), and Estonia (Gardner and Standaert
2003). Of particular relevance to this project is Sue Jansen's (2008) critical
deconstruction of the neoliberal assumptions underpinning the commercial practice of
nation branding. Her essay helped to operationalize how the Party's Olympic visual
narrative configures identity and history to meet market expectations.
With the importance of reputation and image in mind I return to the nation
branding literature that inspired this research (Aronczyk 2007; Wang 2003; Wang 2008;
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Anholt 2002,2006,2007; Berkowitz, et aI2007). Joshua Ramo's essay, "Brand China,"
(2007) is foundational to this project. He contends that China suffers from an "image
emergency" problem and that "China's greatest strategic threat today is its national
image" (Ramo 2007: 12). In Chapter II I describe China's image emergency in more
detail and emphasize the importance of the Beijing Olympics in addressing this image
emergency.
10
Methodology
Fabienne Darling-Wolfs (2005) semiological-discourse analysis of the 2002
Tokyo World Cup is a model of the method I intend to utilize in this project. Her study
examined how the visual narrative constructed in support of the World Cup on sites of
popular culture in Tokyo "located [Japan] visually in relation to the rest of the world and
managed to tum this 'foreign' sporting event into a specifically Japanese cultural
phenomenon" (Darling-Wolf 2005: 184). By extending Darling-Wolfs method of
semiological-discourse analysis to the visual narrative surrounding the 2008 Beijing
Olympics, I investigate how the Party attempted to visually and discursively construct
brand China in relation to the rest of the world. Semiological method is useful because it
provides a framework for explaining how denotive, surface level meanings of images are
transformed into deeper, connotive symbolic meanings. For instance, a surface level
reading of the symbol for the IOC acknowledges a simple representation of five
interlocking multi-colored rings. Semiological method is a way of tracing the movement
of this surface level reading into a symbol of the world's largest sports mega-event and
all of the institutions, ideas, and actors that surround it. Through application of
semiological method to the Party's Olympic visual narrative I will trace how the images
in this narrative connote notions such as newness and innovation.
Discourse analysis is a method well suited to this project because it is concerned
with the discursive construction of knowledge and therefore extends to my interest in the
social construction of brand China. Discourse analysis makes it possible to understand
how the totality of the Party's Olympic imagery is part of a discourse that reflects the
dominant ideologies and relations of power in China today-essential for understanding
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how the Party dealt with history and identity in its efforts to construct brand China in
particular ways during the Beijing Olympics. Furthermore, applying discourse analysis
methodology to the Party's Olympic visual narrative emphasizes that discursive
production is not a one-way street. Although it is beyond the means of this project to
measure if Euro-American audiences to the Beijing Olympics understood or took up the
connotive meanings of what they were watching, it is enough to acknowledge that the
audience is an active participant in the social construction of identity and knowledge.
Future research might address this shortcoming by investigating the audience as the site
of cultural production of knowledge and the audience's role in the social construction of
national identity - as national brand.
Significance of Research
This project is a way for me to engage my interest in the social, political, and
economic transformations occurring in China today. It is a way for me to make sense of
how and why the China that I witnessed in the summer of 2007 (and the one that I
recognized in the Party's Olympic visual narrative) did not synch with the China that I
read about in Western media when I returned to the United States.
By framing the elements in the Party's Olympic visual narrative as signifiers
about what brand China stands for and where China is going, I can better understand how
Party leaders are attempting to resolve what Joshua Ramo calls China's "image
misalignment" or "image emergency" problem. In this way, this project sheds light on
the complex identity politics that surrounded the Beijing Olympics and therefore the
identity politics that are implicated in the broader context of U.S. - China relations.
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Furthermore, this project sheds light on the increasingly important role that
image, reputation, and visual communication play in contemporary neoliberal
international relations. As outlined above, the intersection between international sports
mega-events, identity politics and identity construction, and nation branding has received
sparse attention by academics. This project is significant because it addresses this
shortcoming.
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CHAPTER II
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CHINA'S IMAGE ENIERGENCY AND THE 2008 BEIJING OLYMPICS
In this chapter I briefly present some of the historical and contemporary political
circumstances surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympics. These circumstances reflect what
Chinese policy analyst Joshua Ramo calls China's "image emergency problem." In this
chapter I discuss this image problem and how the Beijing Olympics provided a platform
for the Party to challenge many ofthe negative perceptions and stereotypes that plague
China's international image. In this chapter I also outline some of the broader political
economic goals of the Party and emphasize the importance of the Beijing Olympics in the
Party's efforts to achieve those goals. By adopting Joshua Ramo's frame for
understanding China's image problem as a branding problem, this chapter sets the stage
for my analysis of how the projected national images embedded within the visual
narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics function in the Party's attempts to reposition
brand China in the "nation brand market."
The roots of China's image emergency problem lay on both sides of the Pacific
and can be traced to historical misperceptions, stereotypes, and racist "otherizing"
discourses that have manifest between China and Euro-America at least as far back as a
century (Brownell 2008; Wang 2008). I follow Joshua Ramo, however, in situating the
primary locus of China's image problems within the incredible changes to have occurred
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there in the last 30 years. It is now almost a truism to point out that the "reform and
opening" (B)[1j!t:Jf:5)( gaige kaifang) policies that Deng Xiaoping initiated in 1978 have
enabled China to develop faster than any country in history. The results of these
economic reforms are indeed worthy of praise: hundreds of millions of Chinese have
been lifted out of poverty, nearly half the population (800 million people) has transitioned
to urban lifestyles, and a new generation of Chinese is engaging with the world economy
in a way that "would have been unimaginable 30 years ago" (Ramo 2007: 12). In this
respect China follows a global pattern in which economic reforms and modernization
have lead to profound socio-spatial transformations. What is different in China's case is
the astonishing speed with which these socio-economic and, to a more limited extent,
political transformations have occurred.
Given the speed at which China has changed in the last 25 years, it is perhaps not
surprising that China's internal image of itself is sharply divergent from its external
reputation. Joshua Ramo argues "The world's view of China is too often an unstable
cocktail of out-of-date ideas, wild hopes and unshakeable prejudices and fears," (2007:
12). Furthermore, "China's view of herself often teeters between self-confidence and
insecurity, between caution and arrogance. Chinese officials and intellectuals struggle to
project a clear image of what the country is and what it hopes to become" (12). A
relevant example of the consequence of this "image misalignment" between China's
internal self-perception and the way it is perceived abroad is the storm of controversy that
surrounded the Beijing Olympics. For instance, many ethnic Chinese considered pro-
Tibetan independence protests at the Olympic Torch relays, calls for boycotts of the
Olympics by activist groups such as Dream for Darfur, and Western media's sympathetic
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coverage of the March 2008 riots in Lhasa, Tibet as personal attacks on the Chinese
nation and national identity. The result was an explosion oflarge, indignant "anti-CNN"
protests and displays of Chinese nationalism--especially among China's so-called "angry
youth" population (Barboza 2008; Yardley 2008). Western activists' method of
protesting and vociferously attacking the Party-tactics that may work well in Western
societies-revealed their lack of sensitivity to the importance of "saving face" in Chinese
culture. As IOC chief Jacques Rogges said, "You don't obtain anything in China with a
loud voice. That is the big mistake of people in the West wanting to add their views. To
keep face is of paramount importance ... only one thing works - respectful, quiet, firm
discussion" (AFP 2008). It would seem neither side in this argument properly understood
the motivations of the other or the important cultural differences between them.
Images of Brand China
A compelling reason for why Ramo's argument that China's image problems can
be considered a branding problem is that he grounds his argument in extensive
quantitative marketing research. He reports on the way that Chinese perceive their
country and then compares this data to the images that non-Chinese use to characterize
China. His findings indicate a number of misperceptions about China that are common
among many foreigners (Ramo 2007: 13-14):
• "China is seen as either a land of Mao-suited citizens ... or as a mix of
"Fu man chu" and gong-fu stereotypes with more modern authoritarian
images."
• "Chinese products are seen as low-tech and poor quality."
• "Chinese labor is seen as "sweat-shop" cheap ... [foreign] consumers and
businesses are more likely to reach for the phrase "copycat" than
"innovative."
• "Positive views of China tend to be associated with the country's rapid
economic growth as an opportunity for money making ... Appreciation of
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the cultural, social, and spiritual changes underway in China register with
only a handful of people outside of China."
Ramo's data corroborates the claim that outside of China, knowledge about contemporary
Chinese culture and the social changes it is experiencing are abysmal-people may know
China is old and complex, but few people understand what makes China dynamic and
different or why this dynamism is relevant.
The stereotypes and images of China listed above are important to keep in mind
throughout this paper. They represent the pre-conceived notions with which many
Westerners approached the Beijing Games and thus they are implicated in the social
construction of brand China. Although in this project I do not investigate the role of the
audience in the construction of brand China, their role in the process is undeniable and
points to possible directions for future ethnographic research. In any case, what is
important to keep in mind is that surmounting the negative perceptions listed above is one
of the primary goals of the Party's image "work."
Image Objectives of the Central Communist Party
My understanding of the importance of China's image and representation in the
political economic goals of the Party impacts how I view the function of the projected
national images embedded within the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics.
There are numerous instances of Party leaders explicitly stating the strategic imperative
of improving China's image. For instance, when Hu Jintao addressed the 10th
Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad, he told them:
The fundamental task and basic goal of China's diplomatic work at present and a
certain period in the years to come is to maintain the important development
period featured by strategic opportunities and strive for a peaceful and stable
international environment, a good-neighborly and friendly surrounding
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environment, an environment for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, and
an objective and friendly publicity environment so as to build a fairly well-off
society in an all-around way (People's Daily 2004).
As stated, continued economic development is the Party's number one priority. More
specific to the realm of public diplomacy and foreign policy are the five primary
objectives of the Party's public diplomacy as identified by Chinese political scientist
Wang Yiwei. These objectives parallel the political and economic goals expressed by Hu
Jintao above (Wang 2008: 268; Zhan 1998):
• "More strongly publicize the Chinese government's statements and assertion to
the outside world."
• "Form a desirable image of the [Chinese] state."
• "Issue rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China."
• "Improve the international environment surrounding China."
• "Exert influence on the policy decisions of foreign countries."
These five goals of Chinese public diplomacy reinforce the importance of image
and representation in the Party's image building goals. And Hu Jintao's above statement
serves as an official proclamation of the political and economic goals of the Party.
Together, they underscore the importance of the image building and nation branding
potential of the Beijing Olympics. Finally, it is worth quoting Zhang and Silk for their
description of how sports in China discursively function as an arm of Party policy:
Among these tactics [to maintain power and social control] adopted by the
Chinese nation-state, hosting international sporting events has become a classic
technology to win recognition in the global sphere, reshape urban space, promote
nationalism, and discursively reconstitute disciplined, functional, and productive
Chinese citizens (and thereby, simultaneously, expose the abject other) (2006:
445).
Brand China: Newness, Innovation, and dan ~
Ultimately, Ramo argues, China's image emergency problem manifests because
the world lacks a framework with which to understand the contradictions inherent in
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contemporary China. Lacking such a framework, the misperceptions and stereotypes
mentioned above inform how people outside of China engage with the country. Ramo
advances the metaphor of "brand China" as a way out of the country's image
misalignment problem. Just as commercial brands connote certain images or ideas and
evoke certain feelings or emotions (Mercedes = prestige, Google = innovation), Ramo
argues that brand China needs to remake its image according to the two adjectives that he
feels best describe the country: "newness" and "innovation." In place of tired cliches
about Confucianism, tea, or martial arts, Ramo suggests that newness and innovation
offer the most useful framework with which both sides of China's image misalignment
problem can engage in fruitful dialogue and understanding.
In fact, newness and innovation are already hallmarks of contemporary Chinese
culture. The problem, however, is that people outside of China do not have a framework
within which to place newness and innovation in their imagination about the country, nor
do they typically see signs of newness or innovation coming out of China. The reason for
this, Ramo argues, is twofold: first, China's leaders have heretofore failed to consistently
and credibly project newness and innovation in their dealings with foreign publics (2007:
16). As I show in the following chapter, however, newness and innovation are two of the
most visible and recurrent themes in the Party's Olympic visual narrative, suggesting a
conscious effort by the Party to remake China's image along these lines.
Second and equally important are a Western hegemony over global media
discourse and a lingering Cold War-era distrust of communist regimes in Western
political circles. Both serve to obscure the reality that today's China is a dynamic and
changing place, albeit one often characterized by a seemingly contradictory blend of "old
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China" traditions and signs of "new China," such as bourgeoning working and middle
classes and the new identities that are forming in response to the economic reforms
initiated in 1978. Finally, when considering the complex identity politics involved in
constructing brand China during the Beijing Olympics it is important to keep in mind the
Western preoccupation with defining Chinese identity in order to determine where China
is going in the future. Like all national identities, China's has been constructed as much
by internal discourses of "invention" as it has by its engagement with the cultural
"Other," particularly the United States (Zheng 1999).
In addition to proposing newness and innovation as the flagship themes of brand
China, Ramo suggests Westerners can better understand the country by accepting the
"Chinese idea of dan ('ilk), an adjective which might be translated as a kind of clarity
coming from the combination of opposites" (2007: 18). The character dan ('ilk) reflects a
traditional Chinese value emphasizing the harmony of opposites and the unity of
seemingly contradictory forms-a familiar example of this is the symbol for yin and yang.
"China needs a dan-like national image," argues Ramo, "one that harmonizes opposites,
that contains both the wealth of China and its poverty ... Honesty of this sort can help
foreigners understand that the contradictions they see in modern China are not always
signs of dishonesty or weakness, but rather signs of change" (2007: 19). In my analysis
of the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics I describe how the concept of
dan and the related notion of duilian (anti-thetical couplets in Chinese poetry) are
prominent themes in the design of some of the Olympic venues as well as in the
performance sections of the Opening and Closing ceremonies.
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As important as the Beijing Olympics are to China's image "work," Ramo
cautions against viewing them as a singular instance by which China will be able remake
its international reputation. This is because of the crucial role that credibility and the
audience play in any brand marketing campaign-whether for a corporation or country,
audiences must believe the story is credible if they are to accept the brand's pitch
(Twitchell 2008). In marketing the importance of credibility and audience perceptions
relates to the country-of-origin effect and it is certainly applicable to brand China's
negative international reputation. Without sufficient credibility, the projected national
images in the Party's Olympic visual narrative may fail to inspire the desired changes in
China's image. As Ramo warns:
[China's leaders] must avoid the temptation to paper over China's real identity
with politically palatable, saleable images that don't correspond to reality ... To
think old-style "broadcast" propaganda campaigns can work anymore is an out of
date idea. Chinese who pin their hopes on the 2008 Olympics to remake the
nation's image are similarly making a miscalculation. The only single events that
remake national images tend to be bad ones. And positive events, no matter how
large, can only impact the image of a nation if there is a framework for people to
fit that image into (2007: 18).
In this project I argue that the Beijing Olympics made a positive step forward in
constructing the kind of framework Ramo advocates. Furthermore, nation branding
practitioner Simon Anholt does believe that staging international mega-events such as the
Olympics can raise a nation brand's profile. But he agrees with Ramo that they are not a
means by which countries can "whitewash" the problems afflicting their brands-again,
credibility is key (Anholt 2006).
In this chapter I have emphasized the complex identity politics that surround
China's image in general and the Beijing Olympics in particular. China's image
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emergency problem cannot be blamed solely on the Central Communist Party. Western
fears about communism and stereotypes of Chinese identity are also a factor behind the
negative images used to characterize China by non-Chinese. In the following chapters I
consult other nation branding research to consolidate the perceptions of China discussed
above into three main images of the country: China is a place of sweatshop cheap labor
and shoddy, possibly dangerous manufactured goods; it is considered a dictatorship,
heedless of human rights; and it is a place of tremendous environmental degradation and
pollution.
In this chapter I also introduced the concept of brand China in terms suggested by
Joshua Ramo. Ramo's emphasis on newness, innovation, and the Chinese concept of dan
O~) as the flagship themes of brand China return in my analysis of the visual narrative
surrounding the Beijing Olympics. In the following discussion it is important to keep in
mind the political economic goals of the Party mentioned above-while sustained
economic growth and a peaceful international political environment are central to these
goals, improving China's image is perhaps the most pertinent political and economic
objective in this discussion. In the following chapter I build on the frame established
here to investigate how visual imagery from the Beijing Olympics functioned
simultaneously as signifiers of Chinese national identity, emblems of brand China, and
projected national images that reveal policy and economic goals of the Party.
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CHAPTER III
PROJECTED NATIONAL IMAGES IN THE 2008 BEIJING OLYMPICS
Browsing the Beijing2008 website reveals images, graphics, and text related to
the three concepts that organized the Beijing Olympics: the People's Olympics, High-
Tech Olympics, and Green Olympics. In the following three sections I focus on the
primary, iconic images that correspond to each Olympic concept. I then discuss how the
Opening and Closing ceremonies also fit within this visual narrative. In the subsequent
chapter I contextualize the visual elements described below within the nation branding
literature that forms part of the theoretical foundation for this project. By demonstrating
how symbols of Chinese national identity displayed during the Olympics are also
symbols of brand China, I emphasize their function in the Party's attempts to reposition
brand China in the global national brand hierarchy.
People's Olympics
China's Olympic emblem, "Chinese Seal, Dancing Beijing" and its slogan, "One
World, One Dream," provide useful illustrations of the projected national images
embedded within the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics. Figure 1 below
is a graphic for the Beijing Olympics slogan:
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One World One Dream
Figure 1: Official slogan and emblem of the 2008 Beijing Olympics·
At the top of the graphic is the Beijing Olympics emblem, "Chinese Seal, Dancing
Beijing" (described below); although small, the Olympic Rings anchor the graphic to the
Olympics institution. Below the emblem are Mandarin characters that pronounce, in the
romanized system ofpinyin, tong yI ge shijie, tong yI ge mengxiang. This literally
translates as "same world, same dream." "One World, One Dream" appears in English
below the Mandarin characters.
A more elaborate explanation of the connotive meanings behind the slogan can be
found on the Beijing2008 website:
It reflects the values of harmony connoted in the concept of "People's Olympics",
the core and soul of the three concepts - "Green Olympics, High-tech Olympics
and People's Olympics"... It expresses the firm belief of a great nation, with a
long history of 5,000 years and on its way towards modernization, that is
committed to peaceful development, harmonious society, and people's happiness.
It voices the aspirations of 1.3 billion Chinese people ("Slogan for Beijing
Olympics" 2008).
I Source: http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beij ing2008/graphic/n214068253 .shtm I
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China's ancient historical roots (its "long history of 5,000 years") onto its recent
modernization and reform efforts. Harmony is central to this vision-reflected in, among
other things, the use of the phrase "harmonious society" (~IJi~*±~ hexie shehui).
"Harmonious society" is an oft-heard political maxim used by Hu Jintao and other Party
leaders. Likewise, ''peaceful development" (~O-f'jjz1=f heping tayli) is another motto
frequently used in Chinese political discourse. They are (at least nominally) guiding
principles in contemporary Chinese politics. As Ramo points out, however, the original
translation and wording of "peaceful development" was "peaceful rise" (~O-f l!J!ffiJE9
hepingjueqi), a slogan that created controversy and anxiety among Western watchers of
Chinese foreign policy. "Peaceful rise simply wasn't credible," explains Ramo. "It ran
counter to decades of Western images about China and, as a result, felt more like
propaganda than honest, resonant insight into Beijing's intentions" (2007: 10). Later, I
return to this example, as it illustrates the critical factor that credibility plays in the
Party's image building and nation branding efforts.
The centrality of unity and harmony in the underlying, connotive meaning of
"One World, One Dream" reflects a historical trend in Chinese political philosophy that
distinguishes it from "Western" political discourse. Yiwei Wang, a prominent scholar in
Chinese foreign policy, explains that, "Chinese political thinking first asks, "Who are
we?" creating the concept of the "whole world as one family," and emphasizing the
creation of harmony" (2008: 262). Wang compares this to the Western political-
philosophical trend that asks first, "Who are you?" and "is concerned with the problem of
identity, with distinguishing and making friends and enemies, exploring 'us' and
'others'" (Wang 2008: 262). Wang's lesson underscores the long standing tradition of
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philosophical trend that asks first, "Who are you?" and "is concerned with the problem of
identity, with distinguishing and making friends and enemies, exploring 'us' and
'others'" (Wang 2008: 262). Wang's lesson underscores the long standing tradition of
conceiving of the "whole world as one family"-albeit with China at the center-and the
impOliance of harmony and unity in Chinese culture.
Figure 2 below is China's Olympic emblem:
-g~~tn.) ~\l&)?
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Figure 2: "Chinese Seal, Dancing Beijing," official emblem of the 2008 Beijing Olympics2
The image is called "Chinese seal, Dancing Beijing." The white figure, posed on a red
tablet in a dance-like or running gesture appears graceful, open, and flowing. The font
used for "BeUing 2008" is calligraphic in style, suggestive of movement and flow. The
Olympic rings, situated at the bottom of the image, anchor the emblem to the Olympic
institution.
The white figure is actually a calligraphic depiction of the character jIng:
~
Jj\
JIng means "capital" in Mandarin and it is the second component of China's
capital city, Beijing (:Ilffi). "Chinese seal, Dancing Beijing" emphasizes the centrality of
Beijing to the Chinese nation and signals Beijing's increasingly important role as an
2 Source: http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/graphic/n2 ] 407008] .shun I
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international hub of commerce and culture. '''Dancing Beijing' is a kind invitation," the
website author(s) write. "The open arms in the emblem say that China is opening its
arms to welcome the rest of the world to join the Olympics, a celebration of 'peace,
friendship and progress of mankind'("The Olympic Emblem" 2008). As the description
suggests, the second-level or connotive meanings of China's Olympic emblem are ideas
such as openness and an inviting, welcoming spirit; the emblem connotes dance,
movement, grace, and f1ow.
Figure 3 below maintains the projected national images of movement, grace, and
flow.
Figure 3: Graphic for the Cultural Olympics3
Figure 3 is the emblem for the Cultural Olympics, a secondary initiative subsumed under
the broader campaign of the People's Olympics. Note the absence of the Olympic rings
in this graphic-it is intended to highlight the uniqueness of Chinese culture. The
flowing, dancing figure beneath the large red lantern is consistent in form and style with
the "Dancing Beijing" figure from the Olympic emblem. This is, as the website reveals,
a deliberate measure:
3 Source: http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/graphic/n214070879.shtml
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The design of the Cultural Festival Symbol shows a human being and a lantern
dancing joyfully. Lantern is used (sic) at every traditional Chinese festival. It
symbolizes reunion and other happy occasions, and assembles the soul of the
traditional Chinese culture ... Chinese unique artistic form - calligraphic art is
adopted in the beaming design of the secondary mark, which sets off against the
Olympic Emblem "Chinese Seal, Dancing Beijing" ("Beijing Olympic Cultural
Festival Symbol" 2008).
Elements of traditional Chinese culture are encoded in the emblem for the
Cultural Olympics. The color red is associated with good fortune and good luck in
China; lanterns are, as mentioned, used at traditional Chinese holidays such as the
Lantern Festival on the final day of the Chinese New Year. The prominence of
calligraphy reiterates the themes of movement, grace, and flow.
Figure 4, shown below, is a graphic depicting thefuwa, mascots of the Beijing
Olympics. Fuwa is the romanized word for "blessed child" or "good luck dolls" and
links the character fu (t~ ), meaning "good fortune," with wa (\it ), a popular tenll in
southern China for baby (Macartney 2006). Eachfuwa represents a color associated with
an Olympic ring. The jinva also express elements of Chinese history and culture.
Figure 4: The Five Fuwa, official mascots of the 2008 Beijing Olympics4
4 Source: http://en.be Uing2008.cn/37/03/column2J t990337.shtml
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The website for the 2008 Beijing Olympics explains what each ofthefuwa
represent. The story behind Beibei, the bluefuwa on the far left in Figure 4, is explained
in detail:
In China's traditional culture and art, the fish and water designs are symbols of
prosperity and harvest. And so Beibei carries the blessing of prosperity. A fish is
also a symbol of surplus in Chinese culture, another measure of a good year and a
good life.
The ornamental lines of the water-wave designs are taken from well-known
Chinese paintings of the past. Among Fuwa, Beibei is known to be gentle and
pure. Strong in water sports, she reflects the blue Olympic ring ("The Official
Mascots" 2007).
Thus the fuwa are more than just appealing, whimsical mascots. Their very
form-down to the lines and strokes that comprise them-encodes an essence of
"Chineseness." While on the surface thefuwa are whimsical and playful, the description
of Beibei reveals that eachfuwa communicates important aspects of Chinese history and
culture.
It is worth noting that Chinese artist Han Meilin designed the Olympic emblem
and thefuwa mascots. Han Meilin's role as one of the lead artistic figures behind the
visual narrative for the Beijing Olympics reminds us that the Party is not the only actor
responsible for the production of visual representations of Chinese identity during the
Olympics. In an interview with Mary Carillo, a sports journalist for NBC, Han expressed
his desire for his Olympic art to build China's image by contributing to China's "export
of culture." "I would like to export culture," he said, "to help people understand our
[Chinese] traditional way oflife."s Han Meilin is not a Party bureaucrat-he was even
5http://www.nbcoJympics.com/viclcQ/pJayer.jltml?assetid~c0821 marvhealer ja387anclchannelcode=aboutbe
ijing.
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imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. Yet, he is clearly sensitive to China's image
emergency problem and hopes his work contributes to a more positive international
perception of China.
Elsewhere, however, Han Meilin expressed dissatisfaction with the Party for what
he felt was micromanagement over his creative and artistic license. In an article for the
Times Online, journalist Jane Macartney claims, "Even the designer, the artist Han
Meilin, has made remarks that show he is less than delighted with the five dolls [thefuwa
mascots]. He said that it was as if officials guided his pen and, while they may have a
correct view of the world, their view of art was not necessarily correct" (Macartney
2006). Han Meilin's open criticisms of the Party's involvement in the design ofthefuwa
mascots reflect the complexity at the site ofproduction of the images that surrounded the
Beijing Games. Although Han Meilin designed the Olympic emblem and thefuwa
mascots, his comments assert the Party's influential role in deciding upon the content and
form of the images investigated in this project. This is an important point because it
strengthens the connection of the images in this discussion-decontextualized from their
original site of production as well as from the site of the audience's reception-to the
Party and its political economic goals.
What kinds of projected national images can we "read," semiologically speaking,
from the above graphics? They portray China as a graceful, flowing, and welcoming
civilization. They reflect elements of ancient Chinese culture, such as calligraphy, the
color red as a symbol of good fortune and prosperity, and the prominence oflanterns in
Chinese festivals. They celebrate Beijing's role as the capital of an ancient civilization-
and thus with all of the wisdom and benevolence associated with ancient civilizations.
-----------_._---------
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And the fuwa emphasize playfulness and a whimsical, childlike spirit-an image that
certainly challenges the notion of China as a heavy-handed, oppressive, authoritarian
state.
The two primary visual elements in the above narrative-the slogan "One World,
One Dream" and the emblem "Chinese Seal, Dancing Beijing"-are both anchored by
the presence of the Olympic rings. By situating the Olympic rings beside visual
representations of Chinese national identity, Party leaders signal that by hosting the
Olympics, Beijing (and by extension, China) is a fully modem and legitimate player in
international world affairs. This parallels Darling-Wolfs analysis of the visual narrative
surrounding the 2002 World Cup in Japan. "The visual discourse surrounding the World
Cup," she wrote, "served to locate Japan assertively as an important player in a world
event that was until recently heavily dominated by non-Asian nations...Japan visually
claimed its place as a participant in the global culture created by transnational capitalism"
(2005: 189). Likewise, the presence of the Olympic rings raises awareness that China is
a part ofthe modem world order upon which the logic ofthe Olympics is predicated.
High-Tech Olympics
Recall that Joshua Ramo argues that newness and innovation are the most
compelling and useful images that the Party can use to change its external reputation.
"The first, important step" in China's image building efforts, Ramo argues, "is to make a
decision that China's constant newness is the most useful framework for understanding
the country" (2007: 43). As described above, China's international image and reputation
problems revolve around the fact that "most people in the world already know China is
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an old and complicated culture" but they do not understand or see newness and
innovation as hallmarks oftoday's China (2007: 43).
Newness and innovation are certainly reflected in the many feats of monumental
architecture that emerged in Beijing ahead ofthe 2008 Olympics. Party leaders rightly
understood the Olympics were an opportunity to demonstrate China's capacity for
technological innovation to the billions ofviewers watching worldwide. The images
below are just a few examples of the tremendous efforts that Party leaders took to build
Beijing's image-not only as the capital of a resurgent China, but also an international
capital of high-tech engineering and innovation.
The National Stadium is perhaps the premier icon of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
Its appearance is at once striking and awe-inspiring, its size daunting. Below are a
graphic (Figure 5) and a photograph (Figure 6) of the National Stadium (also called the
"Bird's Nest" for the way its crisscrossing steel beams resemble a bird's nest).
Figure 5: Graphic of the National Stadium (Bird's Nest)6
Figure 6: Photo of the National Stadium (Bird's Nest)7
6 Source: http://photo.beijing2008.cn/news-214078095-214047920.html
7 Source: http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/nstlhead Iines/n214260875 .shtm I
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Designed by the Swiss architectural firm, Herzog and DeMeuron, China
Architecture Design Institute, and Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, the 91,000 seat National
Stadium is a marvel of modem architecture and design. It is the world's largest steel
structure. Thanks to manufacturing innovation, it was made from 42,000 tons of a unique
type of steel produced entirely in China ("High technology" 2008). It covers an area of
258,000 square meters and cost 423 million US dollars to build. A semiotic reading of
the Bird's Nest would emphasize how its crisscrossing, steel beams suggest innovation,
strength, and size; at the same time, its porous exterior (a membrane made from a similar
material as the National Aquatics Center, below) evokes feelings of openness and
transparency (Eaton 2008).
Ai Weiwei is one of China's most famous contemporary artists. He was involved
in the planning and design of the National Stadium but subsequently divorced himself
from the project because of feelings similar to those of Han Meilin. Ai referred to the
image of China projected during the Beijing Olympics as a "pretend smile." After
working on the National Stadium design team, he openly criticized the Party's use of the
Olympics to establish greater control over media and social life in China. In an article for
the New York Times, Ai questioned, "When these new security rules and restrictions are
put in place, how can one smile and perform, cheer and pose?" (Zhang 2008). Ai's
scathing comments about the Party's handling of the Olympics challenge China's image
as a land of harmonious, "Mao suited citizens"; furthermore, his comments reinforce the
claim that an often contentious politics of identities and interests converged around the
production of visual representations of Chinese identity for the Olympics. The National
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Stadium also merits mentioning because it was one of the only venues designed by a
Chinese architecture firm-non-Chinese, international architecture firms designed almost
all of the rest of the Olympic venues.
Eugene Wang, a professor of Chinese Art History at Harvard University,
deconstructs some of the meanings behind the National Stadium. The metaphor of a
bird's nest "suggests certain upward aspirations," explained Wang. "The use of the word
'bird' suggests flying, loftiness. It speaks to the Chinese at this time of anxiety and
eagerness to take off." Furthermore, its open outer frame expresses China's stance on
modernization and globalization. "Now the country is opened up," Wang said, "made
more susceptible to modernization. It's no longer this old, walled city" (Eaton 2008).
Delin Lai, a Beijing born architectural historian, echoes Wang's sentiments. Lai believes
the design of the National Stadium testifies to the commitment of the Party to emphasize
openness in its projected national images. "Undoubtedly," Lai said, "the design
demonstrates the desire of the Chinese government to portray the open image of
contemporary China-a country that would actively join the international community and
confidently accept global culture" (Eaton 2008). Certainly in terms of an external
marketing device, the Bird's Nest succeeds in imaging China as innovative and high-
tech; the Bird's Nest may perhaps also connote ideas such as "lifting off' in economic
prosperity or that China is opening up to and welcoming in "global culture."
The National Aquatic Center (the Water Cube), pictured below in Figure 7, is
another architectural marvel constructed for of the Olympics. Its futuristic look helps
build China's image as a center of high-tech architecture.
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Figure 7: The National Aquatic Center (Water CUbe)8
Like the unique, flexible steel of the Bird's Nest, the Water Cube is also made of
a high-tech substance. The "bubbles" in its outer membrane are made ofETFE (ethylene
tetrafluoroethylene), originally designed for use in the aviation industry. Not only is this
the first time ETFE has been used in China, but also the Cube's massive size (110, 000
square meters) makes it the world's largest and most complicated membrane structure
("Magical ETFE membrane" 2008). The ETFE membrane for the Water Cube was
produced in China through a joint venture at a considerable savings than its manufacture
would have cost elsewhere. Moreover, just as construction of the National Stadium
required engineering ingenuity and illliovative thinking, manufacture of the ETFE
material and construction of the Water Cube advanced China's architectural and
engineering capabilities ("National Aquatics Center" 2008).
Among other advanced, high-tech features, the Water Cube can:
• Clean itself by virtue of the coefficient of friction of its ETFE membrane, which
is less than that of dust, meaning that as long as it rains it will remain clean
("Magical ETFE membrane" 2008).
8 Source: http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/nac/head lines/n214241555.shtml
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• Regulate humidity and keep a comfortable temperature with no steam ("Water
Cube keeps comfortable humidity" 2008).
• Illuminate the night sky with a 16.7 million color exterior LED system ("Water
cube is unveiled" 2008).
• Each "bubble" can resist the weight of a car ("Magical ETFE membrane" 2008).
For these reasons, BOCOG and the Party assert that the Water Cube is the world's most
high-tech swimming facility.
Although not directly related to the Beijing Olympics, Terminal 3 at Beijing
International Airport and the MAGLEV train in Shanghai were both constructed and
premiered in time to be displayed during the media spotlight accompanying the
Olympics. China's leaders scored another "world's biggest" with the opening of
Terminal 3 at Beijing Airport in February 2008. At 1.8 miles long and 10 million square
feet of floor space, Terminal 3 is the largest airport in the world. It cost nearly US$4
billion to construct, required the relocation of lO villages, and took 50,000 workers only
four years to build (Spencer 2008). In keeping with Beijing and Party leadership's
penchant for combining high-tech, innovative design with signs that evoke traditional
Chinese culture, Terminal 3 is fashioned in the shape of a dragon, complete with scale-
shaped vents, red and gold paint, and a long body with a tail at one end and a large, wide
head at the other. In Chinese mythology, dragons represent wisdom and vitality. The red
and gold colors of Terminal 3 represent the colors of the Forbidden City (Spencer 2008).
The MAGLEV (magnetic levitation) train in Shanghai represents another step the
Party took to boost China's image as a leader in high-tech innovation. Capable of speeds
up to 300 miles per hour, the MAGLEV is the fastest train in the world (Berkowitz, et al
2007: 173). Japan's introduction of the bullet train during the 1964 Olympics had a
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similar effect: it helped raise awareness that Japan was no longer a copycat producer of
technology, but an innovator as well (Fishman 2005).
In fact, there is a strong parallel between what the 1964 Tokyo Olympics did for
Japan and what the 2008 Beijing Olympics could do for China. The 1964 Olympics were
a watershed moment in Japan's reconstruction efforts-both physically and
psychologically-signaling to the world its progress twenty years after World War II
(Pempell 1998). Darling-Wolf explains how "The 1964 Olympics hosted by newly
reconstructed Tokyo represented another symbolic shift in Japanese cultural and global
identity from defeated to prosperous nation" (2005: 185). Likewise, the Party hopes that
by showcasing high-tech, modem infrastructure such as Terminal 3, the MAGLEV train,
or Beijing's improved subway system ("Beijing subway" 2008) it will change people's
minds about China as a copycat, low-cost manufacturing center.
One of the more interesting aspects of China's overall visual narrative is the
frequent juxtaposition of opposites. Harmonizing opposing forms reflects the principle of
duilian or "antithetical couplets" in Chinese poetry and closely parallels the concept of
dan described in the previous chapter. Delin Lai explains how the cube shape of the
National Aquatic Center sets off against the circular shape of the Bird's Nest, embodying
duilian or dan as commanding principles in Chinese culture: "One uses steel," he said,
"the other plastic; one is heavy, the other light. Other contrasts include masculinity and
femininity, perforation and solidity, movement and static. Most important are the circle
and square, which symbolized heaven and earth [respectively] in traditional Chinese
cosmology" (Eaton 2008). The theme of harmonizing opposites is also expressed in the
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shapes, colors, and patterns utilized during the Opening and Closing ceremonies
(discussed below).
It does not require deep application of semiotic theory to the visual narrative
surrounding the High-Tech Olympics in order to conclude that it projects newness and
innovation as national images that represent China. Semiotic theory does reveal,
however, how the visual elements described in this section signify important elements of
Chinese mythology, such as dragons, the colors red and gold, and the principle of duilian.
Duilian unites the opposition between the circular Bird's Nest and the square form ofthe
Water Cube-signifying the importance of harmony and unity in the Chinese cultural
imaginary. The porous membrane ofthe Bird's Nest connotes openness and
transparency, connecting with many of the connotive meanings behind the visual
elements in the People's Olympics. In addition to duilian and important signs from
Chinese mythology, the High-Tech Olympics projected national images such as size,
strength, innovation, and high-tech engineering.
Green Olympics
China's breakneck economic development has come at a severe cost to the
environment. Air pollution, water pollution, and desertification are just a few of the
many environmental crises facing China today. As China has become the world's
leading emitter of greenhouse gases, pollution has moved beyond a domestic issue to
become an international concern. Environmental degradation is even challenging the
Party's hold on power by threatening to derail development and instigating mass
environmental protests (Kahn and Yardley 2007).
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As noted above, China's environmental degradation has a negative impact on its
international image. In fact, pollution concerns were one of the main reasons why
China's bid to host the 2000 Olympics was unsuccessful. Therefore, in their bid to host
the 2008 Olympics, Party leaders promised the Beijing Games would be the "most
environmentally friendly games ever" (Hildebrandt 2003).
Their commitment to this promise seems to have been sincere: more than
US$16.8 billion was invested into environmentally related projects, making the Beijing
Olympics a catalyst for infrastructure development and other projects to improve
Beijing's environment. Beijing's Olympics bid touted the Olympics as an opportunity to
promote the development of clean energy sources such as geothermal heat, wind farms,
and solar panels. For example, energy and water conservation were central to the design
ofthe Water Cube. According to the Beijing2008 website, the Water Cube collects and
recycles 10,000 tons of rain water; it can save 140,000 tons of recycled water a year; and
it utilizes an ingenious air-conditioning and humidity regulation system that minimizes
energy use (making it a showcase of high-tech environmental technology as well as high-
tech engineering) ('''Water Cube': green architectural wonder" 2008). Likewise,
sustainable development principles featured prominently in the design of the National
Stadium. Among other environmentally friendly features, the lighting for the Bird's Nest
was powered by a 130 kW photovoltaic system ("UNEP: Green energy" 2008).
Prior to the start of the Beijing Games, air pollution was one of the major
concerns of the IOC and foreign athletes. Beijing took drastic steps to curb sources of air
pollution by shuttering polluting factories, limiting the number of cars allowed on the
road for two months prior to the Games, and even banning the use of spray paint outdoors
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(Jacobs 2008). The Party literally took to seeding the clouds with silver iodide paliicles
in an effort to ensure rain did not fall on the National Stadium during the Opening
Ceremony (Demick 2008). It appears their efforts to curb air pollution during the
Olympics were successful, as reports from Beijing indicate that air quality was good
except for a mild "mist" that was present at the start of the Games ("Beijing registers
eighth day" 2008).
Figure 8 below is the Environmental Symbol of Beijing 2008. By its nature, it
lends itself more readily to semiotic analysis than the environmental improvements and
efforts to "green" Beijing mentioned above.
Figure 8: Graphic for the Green Olympics9
The Environmental symbol portrays the dancing figure from the Cultural
Olympics and other Olympic graphics beneath a canopy of figurative green leaves. At
the first-order or denotive level the symbol is rather straightforward: it is simply a
dancing figure underneath several green ovals, anchored by the words "Environment"
and "Beijing 2008."
9 Source: bttp://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beij ing2008/graphic/n214070883.shtml
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In the more detailed description from the Beijing2008 website we again see an
emphasis on harmony and unity, themes highlighted in the People's Olympics and in the
architecture featured in the High-Tech Olympics. The symbol "represents harmony and
unity between human beings and nature. Just like swinging coloured strips that encircle
and cross each other, the green lines form a luxuriant crown of a tree and recall flowers in
full bloom, embodying the sustainable development of nature" ("Environmental Symbol"
2008). The image of a flower in full bloom also suggests China's opening up and reform:
a blooming flower is a metaphor for China's receptiveness to new markets, new
identities, and new flows of capital and investment.
History and Identity in the Opening and Closing Ceremonies
The Opening and Closing ceremonies, directed by acclaimed Chinese
moviemaker Zhang Yimou, are rife with semiotic significance. Because of their
performative, expressive content, the Opening and Closing ceremonies provide some of
the clearest examples into what happens to history and identity in the construction of
brand China during the Beijing Olympics. A thorough semiotic analysis of the
ceremonies could comprise an entire thesis project in and of itself. Therefore, here I am
only able to touch on some of the most salient (to me) and significant moments from the
Opening and Closing ceremonies.
The Opening ceremony featured an hour-long "history and culture" performance
piece in which Chinese dancers and actors performed seminal events from Chinese
history, such as the invention ofthe movable type printing press, paper, the compass,
gunpowder. The latter half of the performance emphasized the economic achievements
of the past thirty years reforms and the technological, social aspirations Party leaders
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have for the futme of China-e.g., the space walk section in which two Chinese
taik6ngren *~A (astronauts) "space walked" down from the top of the National
Stadium to open a chamber on the floor, out of which emerged a large globe covered by
dancing, racing people. Among its many other visually spectacular moments, the
Opening ceremony featmed CGI fireworks (that sparked, literally, some minor
controversy), flying dancers covered in tiny lights, 2008 Chinese drummers precisely
arranged in the shape of a square, a massive human-powered Chinese printing press on
which the characters for the word "harmony" (fO) emerged, and an immense shan-shui
Li-l * (mountain-water) painting constructed upon one of the world's largest LED
screens. The LED screen, pictured in Figure 9 below, was an impressive feat of
tec1mology on display dming the Opening Ceremony. At 230 feet long by 70 feet wide,
it eventually covered nearly the entire stadium floor.
Figure 9: Screenshot of the LED sueen unfolding during the Opening Ceremony
It is worth noting that Joshua Ramo, a primary source for this essay, was Bob
Costas's co-host during the Opening and Closing Ceremonies. As the LED screen began
to unfold, Ramo commented, "We begin here with something highly symbolic: a blank
sheet of paper, expressing the wish of the Chinese for people around the world as they
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look at this country over the next seventeen days to fill a blank sheet of paper with new
images and maybe to replace images that the Chinese themselves are, in many cases,
eager to leave behind." In all, the Opening ceremony highlighted two aspects of Chinese
culture: its 5,000-year history (with an emphasis on Confucian principles, such as
harmony and unity) and the economic, technological progress of the past thirty years.
One of the most glaring gaps in the culture and history section was the complete
absence of any reference to the Chairman Mao Zedong and the events that took place in
China during the tumultuous Mao-years (1949 - 1976). Not even a nod to the historic
founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was included in the Opening
ceremony-a rather obvious gap in the country's history. Although Zhang Yimou
directed the Opening ceremony, decisions about its content ultimately rested with Party
leadership (Magnier 2008). Thus, from the perspective of an external marketing
campaign, it is not surprising that Party leadership would shy away from signs that
reference Mao Zedong or China's communist past. Party leaders may have worried that
reference to the Mao-years would stir unease and anxiety among Western audiences, ever
fearful and distrustful of communism and images of "Red China."
A less externally focused explanation for why there were no images from the
Mao-years during the Opening ceremony reflects the exigencies of internal Chinese
identity politics. Projecting images that reference its own sordid history and past failures
does little to serve the political economic goals of the Party---especially when survivors
of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution remain alive. In any case, the
absence of the Mao-years from the Opening ceremony is a clear example of how the
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Party modified Chinese history to project a more positive image of China during the
Beijing Olympics.
The Closing ceremony was an equally phenomenal display of technological
wizardry, logistics, and Chinese cultural values. Contrasting colors, such as yellow and
red, featured prominently (in Chinese culture, yellow is associated with royalty and
prosperity; red is associated with good luck). However, in contrast to the Opening
ceremony, in which the performers arranged and rearranged themselves in square forms,
the performers in the Closing ceremony repeatedly arranged themselves in a series of
concentric circles. Figure 10 below is a photo from the Opening ceremony; Figure 11 is
a photo from the Closing ceremony.
Figure 10: Square Forms during the Opening
ceremony (Photo credit: Xinhua)
Figure II: Circular fonns during the Closing
ceremony (Photo credit: Xinhua)
In Chinese mythology, circular shapes connote heaven; square forms connote
earth. Their juxtaposition during the Opening and Closing ceremonies embodies the
emphasis on harmony and the reconciliation of opposites in the principles of duilian or
dan.
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EastWestNorthSouth, a popular Chinese-English language blog accessible in the
PRC, collected some of the reactions to the Opening and Closing ceremonies expressed
by Chinese in various other blogs and forums. Although their reactions cannot be taken
as objective indicators of how a majority of the Chinese population viewed the Opening
and Closing ceremonies, their responses illustrate the complex identity politics involved
in the social construction of brand China ( "Chinese Internet Reacts" 2008).
It happens that at least some Chinese were disappointed at the lack of individual,
human faces during the ceremonies. At the Strong Nation forum, a typically pro-
government community,
[T]he number of detractors exceeded the number of supporters by a lot last night.
After viewing the performance, one Strong Nation commentator wrote: "What
does China have except people?" Another commentator replied: "That is truly a
unique Chinese characters. We have 1.3 billion people." "This kind of opening
ceremony is possible only in China, because nobody else has that many people."
But some netizens thought that there was too much lighting and not enough
persons made of flesh and blood. The most acerbic criticism at the Strong Nation
forum is about the "emptiness" and "vacuity." They described this as a work that
represents this "ostentatious, flourishing era" and characterized the work as:
"First-rate techniques, second-rate performances, no ratings for the content."
At the more 'liberal' Tianya forum, the criticisms were even more blunt. Many
people thought that the Beijing opening ceremony was inferior to Athens 2004
because the performance lacked a main theme, it used too many techniques and
the content was incomprehensible to foreigners.
A Chinese at another popular blog and forum portal was more conciliatory in her
reaction:
Since this was a mass event, it was mainly about mass performances .. .In the
one-hour performance section, [Zhang Yimou] expressed the aesthetics of
nationalism thoroughly. In those dances, the dancers had no individual faces
because they only mean something in the context of the group. In other words, in
this group dance, the individual is unimportant and everybody has to follow the
group and consider the overall situation. The effects from these thousand-strong
46
performance are so stunning. To make an inappropriate analogy, this is like an
army moving in formation.
At a different blog, one Chinese proudly defended the ceremonies, dubbing them
"perfect":
I understand that mainland Chinese netizens are condemning it [the Opening
ceremony] for not having flesh-and-blood persons.
This is what amateurs might say.
The Opening ceremony is the only ceremonial rite that all of human kind takes
part in. Supposedly, more than 4 billion people will be watching this event on
television. The only way to present to people of different cultures is to use
audiovisual effects (such as light, color, sound and so on) to showcase Chinese
civilization and to delight people.
What is the point oflooking at flesh-and-blood persons? If you want to look at
them, just go outside and sit by the roadside. You will be able to see plenty of
them. At the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, they had small trucks with some cowboys
on them. What is so good about that? If the street view does not please you, you
can go home, take off your clothes and check out your flab in the mirror. ..
Director Zhang Yimou used colors, lights and flames to let the world come into
contact with Chinese culture while enjoying the stimulation of the senses. It was
done perfectly.
A final example from the Opening ceremony illustrates the importance of image
and representation in the Party's image "work." A minor controversy developed after
revelations that Party leaders instructed Chen Qigang, the ceremony's music director, to
have gap-toothed and chubby faced Yang Peiyi stay backstage to sing the Chinese
anthem, "Ode to the Motherland," while the more camera friendly and "picturesque" Lin
Miaoke lip-synched onstage (Magnier 2008). Although I personally feel this incident
was vastly overblown-it was immediately seized upon by critics of the Party to support
their claim that China cannot be trusted-it does reinforce the argument that the Party
takes its image and representation very seriously. Furthermore, Chen Qigang's
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admission to the international media that Lin Miaoke was lip-synching to Yang Peiyi' s
voice provides another reminder of the multi-sited and complex identity politics that
characterize the production of the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics.
My analysis of the Opening and Closing ceremonies has necessarily glossed over
many other instances that could illustrate the national images that the Party attempted to
project to foreign audiences. Nevertheless, my analysis indicates that both the Opening
and Closing ceremonies maintained an emphasis on China's ancient civilization and the
Confucian values ofharrnony and unity. Both ceremonies emphasized dan and the
reconciling or harmonizing of opposites. And both ceremonies emphasized the economic
and technological accomplishments of the past thirty years' reforms.
Projected National Images in the 2008 Beijing Olympics
The goal of this chapter has been to consider what kinds of projected national
images the Party embedded within the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics.
The idea has been to emphasize that the signs described above are more than just
emblems or logos unique to the Beijing Olympics: they are signs that connote Chinese
history and identity in particular ways and evoke particular, recurring themes, motifs, and
emotions.
The graphics, emblems, and slogan for the People's Olympics connoted ideas
such as grace, flow, and movement. They projected China as open, inviting, and
welcoming. The slogan "One World, One Dream" has roots in historical Chinese
philosophy and political discourse and it reflects contemporary Party rhetoric, such as in
the use of "harmonious society" and "peaceful development" in its description on the
Beijing2008 website. Thefuwa mascots suggest the qualities of whimsy and playfulness.
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Visual materials supporting the People's Olympics were also anchored by the presence of
the Olympic Rings, reminding onlookers that the Party has gained the respect and trust of
the International Olympic Committee, and that, by extension, China is a fully modem,
legitimate member of the international community.
The High-Tech Olympics also emphasized the importance of harmony and unity
in the Chinese cultural imaginary. The opposition between the circular shape of the
Bird's Nest and the square form ofthe Water Cube is an example of the Chinese principle
of duilian and the related character, dan (¥~). The porous structure of the Bird's Nest
suggests openness and transparency. Lastly, the High-Tech Olympics embodied the
adjectives "newness" and "innovation."
The Green Olympics also stressed the importance of harmony and unity in the
Chinese cultural imaginary. The architects employed by the Party designed many of the
Olympic venues to utilize "green" energy sources. BOCOG and the Party also
constructed a number of parks and green spaces throughout Beijing for the Green
Olympics. The graphic for the Green Olympics connoted the idea that China is in
harmony with nature and that it is opening up to new ideas and to the international
community.
The Opening and Closing ceremonies highlighted certain aspects (but not others)
of Chinese history. A conscious effort to project the principle of duilian manifest in the
contrasts between opposing shapes, colors, and levels of ambient lighting. The Opening
and Closing ceremonies also demonstrated the incredible economic gains made during
the past thirty years and signaled the Party's hopes for continued economic growth.
There were very few individual faces during the Opening or Closing ceremonies--one of
-------------------- ---------
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the only individuals was, ironically, the lip-synching Lin Miaoke. There was also a
conspicuous absence of any Mao Zedong or PRC related history from the Opening
ceremonies, suggesting Party leadership is concerned with how ethnic Chinese as well as
critical Euro-American audiences might view such controversial images.
The symbols and images in the above visual narrative are signs that represent
Chinese national identity. They tell stories about Chinese history and they illustrate
important values in Chinese culture. Their form, content, spatial relationship, and
underlying meanings are stylized, symbolic representations of Chinese history and
identity. In the next chapter I describe how they are also logos, symbols, and marketing
devices for brand China.
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CHAPTER IV
BRAND CHINA AND THE 2008 BEIJING OLYMPICS
In this chapter I situate the visual elements described above and the ideas and
emotions they connote more fully within the context of the image building and nation
branding literature that I have drawn upon in this project (Aronczyk 2007; Wang 2003;
Wang 2008; Ramo 2007; Anholt 2002,2006,2007; Berkowitz, et a/2007). In doing so I
illustrate how the projected national images embedded within the visual narrative of the
Beijing Olympics can be viewed not only as representations of Chinese national identity,
but also as rational choices in accordance with the political economic goals of the Party
as defined in Chapter II.
To emphasize how the Party's projected national images can be viewed in terms
of a brand China marketing campaign, I bring the Anholt Nation Brands Index (ANBI) to
bear on the findings from the previous chapter. The ANBI is a quarterly brand value
assessment survey that provides quantitative data concerning the perception of nation
brands among 25,000 survey respondents from 35 countries. The ANBI measures nation
brand performance across six variables: 1) Tourism; 2) Exports; 3) Governance; 4)
Investment/lmmigration; 5) CulturelHeritage; 6) People. Figure 12 below is a graphic
of the National Brand Hexagon and is a visual depiction of China's ANBI ranking for
2007:
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Figure 12: ANBI Hexagon from Berkowitz, et a/2007: p170
China's overall rank in 2007 was 22nd out of 40 and its overall score had
decreased by 3% over the previous 12 months (Anholt 2007). Although China showed a
strong ranking for culture/heritage, it ranks in the bottom third for all other aspects-
governance and exports being two of its lowest-scoring categories. Anholt claims that
Despite China's economic progress, its overall score in the ANBI is falling
because of the unpopularity of its style of governance around the world ...
[However,] improvements can be brought about by governments through
coordinated and comprehensive brand strategies, and sometimes by well-
marketed and managed global events, such as the summer Olympics or even the
soccer WorId Cup (2007: 4).
Thus, according to Simon Anholt, the Olympics do offer the opportunity for China to
improve its national brand image-but as illustrated in the peaceful rise - peaceful
development example in Chapter III, China's dearth of political credibility means it faces
an uphill battle in improving its international image.
Berkowitz, et al follow Ramo and Anholt by pointing out that a successful
branding strategy cannot focus on only one or two of the ANBI performance variables-a
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successful strategy must strengthen all six. They also echo Ramo and Anholt in arguing
that China's low rating in the governance category is the gatekeeper preventing it from
improving in other areas. "In order for the world to see a better China," they write, "the
country must start by improving the governance image that it projects. Many in the West
still believe that China is an oppressive regime" (2007: 171). Figure 13 below is an
indelible image from the 1989 Tian'anmen Square protests. This image, often seen in
U.S. media reports on China, is perhaps one of the dominant ways many Westerners view
China's government and would characterize its governance style.
Figure 13: Tian'anmen Square 1989 - An image of China's governance?
As discussed in Chapter II, the nation branding literature pertaining to China
broadly agrees that outside of the country there are three perceptions that are the most
prevalent and most damaging to its reputation: 1) China's government is viewed as
oppressive, authoritarian, and generally lacking in respect for human rights (reflecting the
ANBI variable governance); 2) China is the "factory of the world," a center of low-
quality manufacturing of other countries' goods (ret1ecting the ANBI variable exports);
and 3) China is a country with an abysmal environmental record (while this cuts across
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all ANBI variables, Berkowitz, et al suggest it most directly impacts China's governance
and investment/immigration ratings) (Berkowitz, et a12007: 172; Anholt 2007; Ramo
2007).
BOCOG's three Olympic concepts directly address the negative perceptions that
characterize China's international image. This is no coincidence, as Yiwei Wang
explains: "China plans to use both the Olympic Games in 2008 and the Shanghai World
Expo in 2010 as opportunities to carry out public diplomacy and promote the China
Brand" (2008: 264). Specifically, the People's Olympics build on brand China's already
positive culture/heritage ranking to challenge the view of China as an oppressive country
that lacks respect for human rights. The High-Tech Olympics challenges brand China's
image as a location for sweatshop-cheap manufacturing and its reputation for low-quality
goods. And the Green Olympics challenge brand China's image as a brand ravaged by
environmental degradation.
In the following discussion of brand China (and in the subsequent discussion of
brand Barcelona) it is useful to recall that brands are fictitious narratives that promise the
consumer an experiential effect. Thus, the projected national images discussed above and
related to brand China below should be considered the types of experiences or emotions
one can expect by interaction with or consumption of brand China.
People's Olympics
We might think of "One World, One Dream" as brand China's slogan and the
Beijing Olympics emblem, "Chinese Seal, Dancing Beijing," as its logo. Viewed in this
light, brand China stands for openness, friendship, and unity; it connotes ideas such as
"harmonious society" (~Oi~t±~ h6xi6 shehui) and "peaceful development" (~Oflt1f
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hepi ng fiiyli); and it emphasizes the wisdom and benevolence associated with an ancient
civilization such as China's. These are all ideas that run counter to the image of China as
a center of human rights violations. Furthermore, connecting the "People's Olympics"
initiative to the globally esteemed narrative trope associated with the Olympic Movement
("peace, friendship, and progress of mankind") promotes a more positive image of the
Party as an internationally responsible and respected actor (at least by the IOC). The
visual narrative for the People's Olympics builds on brand China's culture/heritage
ranking in the ANBI and, at the very least, distracts from its poor performance in the
governance category (Berkowitz, et a12007: 172).
High-Tech Olympics
The High-Tech Olympics is a powerful visual narrative promoting brand China as
innovative and new. It connects directly with Joshua Ramo's argument that newness and
innovation provide the most useful framework for understanding contemporary China.
China's Olympic venues and supporting infrastructure visually signal that brand China
has reached a level of technological proficiency on par or beyond that of many Western
nations. Like Japan in 1964, the High-Tech Olympics visually construct brand China as a
technologically savvy and modem country. By bolstering its image as a center of high-
tech engineering, China can improve its exports and investment/immigration ratings
(Berkowitz, et a12007: 173).
Green Olympics
In his Nation Brands Index report from Ql 2007, Anholt notes "there appears to
be a growing "green" consciousness among some sections of the world's population,
benefiting those nations-such as Sweden-that have a good reputation for
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environmental responsibility" (4). The money and energy devoted to the Green
Olympics suggests Party leadership takes seriously the negative impact that
environmental degradation and pollution have on brand China's performance. By
constructing parks and other greenspaces in Beijing and utilizing sustainable design
practices in the construction and operation of the Olympic venues, Party leaders hoped to
give brand China a "greener," more environmentally friendly image. A lack of smog and
air pollution during the Olympics broadcast projected an image of brand China as one
that is, if given the time, resources, and incentive, capable of improving its environmental
condition. Although viewers may not have seen the "green" infrastructure that the Party
built in Beijing, audiences likely did notice the many days of clear skies that occurred
during the Beijing Games. Berkowitz, et al conclude that China's Green Olympics
initiative can improve its ratings in the governance and investment/immigration category
(2007: 174).
Brand China: Moving Fonvard, Projecting dan ~
As described in Chapter III, the concept of duilian is one of the primary symbolic
themes embedded within the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics.
Furthermore, duilian is closely related to the concept of dan ('{JR.). Ramo proposes dan ¥JR.
as a way for brand China to move forward out of its image emergency problem:
It UJR.] helps express one of the most challenging problems in explaining China:
how can you let people understand China is a land of great opposites, held
together, often with tremendous tension? ... China's opposites are also what
defeat any attempt at a simple explanation of the place-and thus reinforce the
country's reputation as untrustworthy ... Westerners in particular struggle with
the idea of opposites existing at the same time (2007: 42)
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Ramo suggests that although Westerners may struggle with the idea of dan OJR), they are
more than comfortable with newness and innovation. Thus dan OJR) provides a middle
ground on which both Chinese and non-Chinese can come together for mutual dialogue
and understanding. Ramo's argument about dan (~JR) is, I believe, one of the reasons that
makes his argument compelling. Dan OJR) reconciles the cleavages and contradictions in
contemporary China---especially with respect to the socio-spatial transformations that
have occurred as a result of economic reforms and modernization. China's bourgeoning
migrant laborer population is one example of a contradictory image that does not serve
the political economic goals ofthe Party. As with the missing Mao-years from the
Opening ceremony, the absences and gaps in the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing
Olympics point to the identity politics that converged around the Beijing Olympics.
To fully understand how the Party configured Chinese identity and history for
image "work" during the Beijing Olympics, we must ask the questions, why dan OJR),
and why the other projected national images uncovered in Chapter III? Why harmony,
grace, and flow? Why openness, transparency, and high-tech innovation? Why not other
symbols of Chinese identity? For instance, why not the Chinese peasant? Mao Zedong
once said China's greatest strength, that which defined China and made it distinct from
other nation-states, was its "peasant power." Clearly, we do not see any Chinese
peasants, rural-to-urban migrant laborers, or even representations of Mao Zedong and
China's communist history anywhere in the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing
Olympics. Instrumentalist and constructivist theories of identity politics can help explain
how and why this might be so.
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CHAPTER V
IDENTITY POLITICS AND IMAGE "WORK" DURING THE 2008 BEIJING
OLYMPICS
Underlying this project is an assumption that national identity is a socially
constructed category of cultural identity. The literature about national identity can be
roughly divided into three schools of thought: primordialism (Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975),
instrumentalism (Bates 1983), and constructivism (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and
Ranger 1983). In this project I am particularly interested in the latter two theories. The
instrumentalist theory can help answer the question of why we see certain projected
national images (and not others) in the visual narrative of the Beijing Olympics. The
constructivist school of thought can help explain how the particular emotive and symbolic
themes investigated in Chapters III and IV are implicated in the process of the social
construction of brand China.
Instrumentalism and the Party's Olympic Visual Narrative
Essentially, the instrumentalist framework argues that cultural identity groups
rationally will select or highlight those identities (race, gender, class, ethno-linguistic
family) available to them that can maximize the potential for that identity group to
achieve its economic, political, or social goals. In a seminal essay on the politics of
cultural pluralism, Crawford Young (1994) explains how instrumentalist theory "nurtured
the notion that ethnic groups were calculating, self-interested collective actors,
maximizing material values through the vehicle of communal identity" (1994: 23). From
58
the perspective of instrumentalism, "The task of analysis was to identify the political
factors which might activate it [in this case, signs of national identity], to discover the
cultural entrepreneurs who supplied its doctrine, and the activists who exploited such
solidarities" (Young 1994: 22).
I argue that we can view China's image emergency and its image misalignment
problems as the political factors activating the particular emotive and symbolic forms of
national identity discussed in this project. We can view the Party as the primary cultural
entrepreneur supplying the doctrine behind China's image "work." As for the "activists
who exploited such solidarities," I argue the Party should be considered the primary
activist in this case, as it was to their benefit, first and foremost, that the IOC awarded
Beijing the 2008 Olympics and it is the Party that will accrue the international prestige
from staging the Beijing Games. This is not to dismiss the agency of ordinary Chinese or
the benefits they will receive from an improved international image of China, but rather
to emphasize the power of the Party-state apparatus to exploit nationalist sentiments and,
as it were, to decide on the symbolic and emotive content of the projected national
images embedded within the Olympics visual narrative.
In light of the instrumentalist theory of identity politics, the projected national
images underlying the Party's Olympic visual narrative seem quite rational.
Instrumentalist identity politics suggests that the Party selected harmony, movement,
innovation and the other emotive qualities discussed above precisely for their market
appeal and for their explicit challenge to many of the negative perceptions about China
that afflict its international reputation.
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Instrumentalist theory privileges the agency of elites in their ability to decide what
is allowed and what is to be excluded from the discourse of identity. The instrumentalist
emphasis on elites as "cultural entrepeneurs" and decision makers relates Jansen's (2008)
critique of the methodology of nation branding to Broudehoux's (2004, 2007) critiques of
development in post-Mao Beijing. Jansen points out the profoundly hierarchical and
undemocratic methodology of nation branding, tending as it does to eliminate subordinate
ways of knowing and unsavory "social facts" from the branding discourse and to
privilege the desires and goals of the "brand management" class over other, less powerful
interest or identity groups (2008: 134). Likewise, Broudehoux makes a compelling
argument for how the encroachment of neoliberal discourses into Beijing's socio-
economic, political culture has resulted in the enhancement and consolidation of power
among a handful of wealthy elites, furthering the social cleavages and contradictions
manifest in post-Mao Beijing. Incidentally, both Jansen and Broudehoux's arguments
relate to Guy Debord's concerns about the subordination of history and class
consciousness by the postmodern valorization ofvisuality, representation, and brand
image (Debord 1967, 1990). Debord's work on the spectacle as a totalizing discourse
mirrors the totalizing logic of nation branding (Jansen 2008) and suggests a fruitful
avenue for future theoretical and empirical investigation.
Ultimately, instrumentalist theory leads to the suggestion that brand China-like
brand America, brand Germany, or brand Japan-is another type of socially constructed
category of cultural identity, one that conflates national identity with neoliberal, market
values. These values determine what are strategic national images to project as well as
what images may be detrimental to the national brand-and therefore these values imply
60
what should be excluded from the public's view. This explains why we do not see images
of China's "peasant power" or Mao Zedong and communism in the Party's Olympic
visual narrative.
Furthermore, instrumentalist theories of identity politics connect to a strong
parallel between the findings ofFabienne Darling-Wolfs semiotic-discourse analysis of
the 2002 Tokyo World Cup and the results of this study. In her analysis, Darling-Wolf
describes how visual representations of soccer and Westerners in general were "both
visually and symbolically integrated within the Japanese cultural environment in a non-
threatening manner" (2005: 189). My analysis of the visual narrative surrounding the
Beijing Olympics suggests that it functioned in a similar way. By projecting images such
as openness, friendliness, and innovation the Party visually positioned China in a non-
threatening, even inviting manner to the rest of the world. Instrumentalist identity
politics supports the claim that the projected national images embedded within the
Olympics visual narrative are rational choices taken by Party leaders in response to
China's negative international reputation. Of course, without access to Party members
involved in the design of the Beijing Olympics imagery, I cannot verifY the accuracy of
this claim. Nonetheless, instrumentalism makes a compelling connection between
China's image emergency problem and the symbolic, emotive content of the projected
national images embedded within the Party's Olympic visual narrative.
The Social Construction of Brand China
Instrumentalism is vulnerable to the criticism that its emphasis on rational choices
of elite "cultural entrepreneurs" obscures other sites of discursive and cultural practice
that are equally important in the construction of Chinese national identity-as-national
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brand image. That is, whereas instrumentalism and primordialism take the concepts of
national identity and "national brand" as unproblematic givens, constructivism
problematizes the two and focuses on the processes involved in the social construction of
identity. It is in this way that constructivism can shed light on the processes involved in
the social construction of brand China.
Constructivism emphasizes that identity is constructed in day-to-day, routine
social interaction and lived experience. This restores the individual to the picture. "The
process of social construction," explains Young, "proceeds at an individual as well as
group level; in the innumerable transactions of daily life, individuals are engaged in a
constant process of defining and redefining themselves" (1994: 24). In his book, Banal
Nationalism, Michael Billig (1995) argues that the banal and routine practices of
everyday life create spaces in which national identity is (re)constructed and
(re)constituted. "Thinking along the lines of banal nationalism," argues Melissa
Aronczyk, "allows us to imagine how rhetoric" (One World, One Dream), "symbol,
image" (juwa mascots, "Dancing Beijing" emblem; Bird's Nest stadium) "and ritual"
(Opening and Closing ceremonies) "display the nation in seemingly innocuous ways"
(2007: 112-113). The parallel between the projected national images investigated in this
project and Darling-Wolf s conclusions about the function of visual imagery in the 2002
Tokyo World Cup seems relevant here again: by displaying Chinese national identity in
"seemingly innocuous ways"-harmonious, ancient and wise, innovative and new-the
visual narrative for the Beijing Olympics functioned to ameliorate Westerners' anxieties
about China's "peaceful rise."
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Thinking about the identity politics implicated within the visual construction of
brand China during Beijing Olympics creates space for a brief discussion of how similar
issues played out during the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. Comparing the unique historical
and political economic circumstances between the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and the
2008 Beijing Olympics demonstrates the complex discursive practices involved in the
identity politics of staging an international sports mega-event such as the Olympics or
soccer World Cup.
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CHAPTER VI
IMAGE "WORK" AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE 1992 BARCELONA
OLYMPICS
In keeping with my interest in the function of visual representations of national
identity in image "work," I examine the 1992 Barcelona Olympics in much the same way
as I have done for the Beijing Games. In this chapter I illustrate some of the iconic
images from the Barcelona Games and reinforce their role as signifiers of national
identity-as-national brand image. I also discuss Spain's unique historical political
circumstances and the identity politics that operated behind Spain's external image
"work." This discussion ofthe Barcelona Olympics is intended to highlight the
challenges-as well as potential successes-that Beijing faces in repositioning its
international image along the lines suggested by the projected national images embedded
within the Party's Olympic visual narrative.
Whose Games? Catalan National Identity and the Politics of Identity
It is important not to overstate the uniqueness of the Party's use of the Olympics
as a vehicle to build Beijing and China's international image. All countries that host the
Olympics use the opportunity to project positive images of their nation and national
identity to a global audience. As such, the visual narrative surrounding the Barcelona
Olympics functioned in much the same manner as that of the Beijing Games: the goal
was to raise Spain's international profile and reputation. Kennet and de Moragas explain
how
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The central Spanish government was interested in leveraging the Games in the
promotion of Spain's image ... The aim was to reposition Spain internationally
and to overcome some of the tourist stereotypes of siestas, bullfights, and manana.
Spain was to be redefined as a land of passion, closely linked to the sun, but also
as a country of possibilities and opportunities, highlighted in the slogan
"everything under the sun" (2006: 182).
Kennet and de Moragas go on to argue, "This combination of passion, sun, and
dynamism was captured in the Games' logo" (2006: 182). Figure 14 below is the official
emblem from the Barcelona Olympics:
Figure 14: The emblem of Barcelona 1992 (Credit: IOC / Olympic Museum Collections)
The Barcelona section of the IOC website explains the some of the literal as well
as connotive meanings of the Barcelona emblem. Figuratively, it represents a human
form in motion, perhaps jumping an obstacle, such as the five Olympic rings below it. It
is comprised of one blue dot for the head (representing the blue of the Mediterranean)
and two simple, flowing lines for the arms and the legs. The yellow line represents the
arms of the figure, curved upwards as if in a welcoming, open, and inviting gesture;
yellow also connotes the sun and references the Barcelona Olympics slogan, "Everything
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under the sun." The red color for the legs is meant to convey the passion and dynamism
to be found in the "new," post-Franco Spain. It is in this way that the central Spanish
government configured brand Spain's national brand image along the lines of passion,
sun, and dynamism.
Many Catalans, however, viewed the Barcelona Olympics as an expression of
Catalonian identity first and foremost, and not necessarily as representative of Spanish
national identity. "For most Catalans," explains the ethnic Catalan and anthropologist
Oriol Pi-Sunyer, "there were two questions of particular importance. One was the issue
of proprietorship (whose Games?); the other being the related matter of what
representations of Catalonia and Catalan society should, or could, be developed" (1995:
36). The goal of the Generalitat-the governing body of the Catalonian autonomous
region-to distinguish Catalan identity as distinct from Spanish identity contrasted
sharply with the commercial and economic goals of the central Spanish state.
In addition to dispelling many of the tourist-based stereotypes about Spanish
identity, the Spanish government in Madrid viewed the Games as a way to legitimate
Spain in the community of "first world" nations. "The lead editorial in the Madrid daily
ABC could proclaim that "this '92 was Spain's final exam (revalida) for membership in
the First World of rich, democratic and organized countries ... these Olympics ... can
be characterized by three aspects: organized, elegant, and cheerful" (Racionero 1992)"
(Pi-Sunyer 1995: 37). Likewise, legitimation in the eyes of the international community
was a primary impetus behind Beijing's Olympic bid.
Aronczyk makes a similar conclusion in her discussion of Spain's nation brand
logo, a visual representation of Spanish national identity designed by Catalan artist Joan
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Miro. As can be seen in Figure 15 below, the logo's form and colors evoke an image ofa
sun. This parallels the symbolic and emotive themes of the Barcelona Olympics emblem.
"The logo and the impact it came to have on the national imagination are widely
considered to have been instrumental in the "repositioning" of the country," Aronczyk
writes. "Once an impoverished and isolated nation emerging from dictatorship, the
country now put forward an image of an effective democracy and a cultural and
cosmopolitan destination. Indeed, the logo symbolizes Spain's entry into modernity"
(Aronczyk 2007: 108; emphasis added).
Figure 15: Spain's Miro Logo 10
Aronczyk goes on to explain the identity politics implicated by the logo:
Spain's Miro logo is considered emblematic of the Spanish nation. But we are
not surprised to learn that the unity conveyed by this symbol is in many ways
disconnected from the country's political and social realities ... Today the federal
boundaries of the Spanish nation-state contain seventeen "autonomous
communities," each with its own rules and desires of self-governance (2007: 122).
10 Source: http://www.vivianvrusselltravel.com/images/spain_ miro.gif
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In fact, Miro himself was less confident and nationalist about his Catalan heritage;
most of his art is not even in Spanish museums (Aronczyk 2007: 122).
With respect to the identity politics surrounding the Barcelona Olympics, of
particular salience here are the ways in which the Generalitat deployed symbolic
representations of Catalan identity to distinguish it from Spanish national identity.
"Much more subtle leverage [of the Olympic Garnes] by the Generalitat," describe
Kennet and de Moragas, "carne in the use of symbols of Catalan identity ... the presence
of Catalan flags at the Olympic venues, the use of Catalan as one of the official languages
of the Garnes, and, perhaps most importantly, the use of the ceremonies as a cultural
display (2006: 182)." One example of how this conflict of interests and identities
manifested in popular acts of creative, visual assertions of Catalonian identity was the
overt display of the Catalonian flag or senyera without also displaying the national
Spanish flag. "Most citizens were perfectly content to hang out the Catalan flag quite
alone, a choice that elicited negative comment by much of the Spanish media" (Pi-Sunyer
1995: 45). Oriol Pi-Sunyer details another example of how Catalans asserted their unique
identity during the Olympics was what happened to Cobi, pictured in Figure 16 below,
the canine mascot of the Barcelona Garnes.
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J
Figure ]6: Cobi - mascot of the 1992 Olympic Summer Games))
Young [Catalan] nationalists strolled through Montjuic with the starred Catalan
flag emblem of the independence movement ... They mounted a "Freedom for
Catalonia" campaign in English ... And they "kidnapped" (or recruited?) Cobi,
the amiable canine mascot of Barcelona '92. Foreign visitors were given fans,
stickers and other souvenirs with cheerful Cobi figures calling for Catalan
independence-and there was very little that the authorities could do about it"
(1995: 46).
Beijng 2008 and Barcelona 1992
The Cobi mascot example illustrates an important distinction between the
Barcelona and Beijing Olympics: while freedom of expression and popular acts of
resistance to "official" politics of identity occurred throughout the Barcelona Olympics,
the same kinds of assertions of identity were all but unthinkable in Beijing's "One World,
One Dream" discourse. Beijing's "One World, One Dream" slogan left no room for
competing meanings of what it means to be "Chinese." The Party made it extremely
difficult if not impossible for disaffected Chinese (or international activists) to mount acts
of resistance, protest, or assertions of ethnic identity, such as by Tibetans, Uyghurs, Falun
II Source: http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/symbols/mascots/
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Gong practitioners, or other identity groups within China that often bear the brunt of the
Party's scrutiny.
In spite of their differences, there are a number of important parallels between the
image "work" objectives of the Barcelona Olympics and the Beijing Games. The goals
ofthe Spanish state clearly parallel many of the Party's reasons for staging the Beijing
Games, such as the chance to showcase the country's economic achievements and
organizational capacities. For both nations the Olympics provided a chance to acquire
legitimacy as a modem, developed country and full member of the "first world" nations.
Second, both the central Spanish government and the Party hoped for their Olympics to
dispel lingering and inaccurate cultural stereotypes regarding their identity. Third, both
Beijing city leaders and Barcelona city officials used staging the Games as the
justification to embark on a massive urban modernization and image construction
campaign (Broudehoux 2004; Kennet and de Moragas 2006: 185).
The most significant difference between the two Olympics and the most revealing
for this project concerns the historical, political circumstances surrounding each nation at
the time they hosted the Olympics. First, Spain is a Western European country-it is
already "safe" and "familiar" in the Western cultural imaginary. Furthermore, Spain
staged its Olympics in Barcelona shortly after emerging from the authoritarian rule of the
Franco dictatorship. Thus Spain was already positioned in a favorable light in the
Western political cultural imaginary-it was a newly emergent democracy, struggling
valiantly to implement a free market system and to integrate a number of distinct identity
groups into one functioning nation-state. Because of its favorable political circumstances
(and in spite of its contentious identity politics), the projected national images embedded
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within Spain's Olympic visual narrative succeeded in constructing Barcelona (and Spain)
as a land of "sun, passion, and dynamism."
China, on the other hand, obviously faces much more challenging historical and
political circumstances. In the Western cultural imaginary, China faces a historical
distrust of communist regimes. Furthermore, it labors against a hegemony of Western
media discourse that seeks out negative stories and images of China first and foremost,
adding to its tarnished global reputation (Brownell 2008). The earlier discussion about
the unpopularity of the Party's governance style and its lack of political credibility is
relevant here again. It is this dearth of political credibility, I argue, that poses the greatest
challenge to the success of the Beijing Games as image "work."
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The Importance of Political Credibility
Although "One World, One Dream" expresses the goal of peaceful development
and harmonious relations with other countries, its success in repositioning brand China in
the coming years depends largely on the ability of the Party to cultivate greater political
credibility with the Western international community. As the above example concerning
the "peaceful rise" (iQ f ~ffi!JE9 hepi ng jueqI) - "peaceful development" (iQ f'iX1f hep
ing fiiyli) controversy reveals, "One World, One Dream" and its subtexts must be seen as
credible if it is to be an effective image building trope for brand China. This is a key
point that Ramo, Anholt, and Chinese political scientist Sheng Ding emphasize: without
sufficient political credibility-exemplified in the governance category of the ANBI-
China cannot improve its national image. Sheng Ding relates the Party's shortage of
political credibility to the concept of soft power:
Without strong political credibility-defined as efficient governance, respect for
democracy, and a commitment to improving human rights-China's other soft
power resources cannot successfully contribute to the project of constructing an
image of the country as a peaceful and responsible great power. China's
widespread corruption and reluctance to pursue real political reform have
hindered Beijing's efforts to establish its national image in the liberal-democratic
world (2008: 644).
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In the end, the conclusion seems to be not so much that people are unwilling or
unable to view China as innovative or new, for example, but rather that its style of
governance is so unpopular that it becomes extremely difficult to cultivate a more
positive reputation in other respects. The unlikelihood that the Beijing Olympics will
usher in sweeping political reforms in China suggests its governance rating will not
tremendously improve. This calls into question the likelihood for success of many of the
other projected national images embedded within the Party's Olympic visual narrative.
Steps to Future Research
ling Wang's Brand New China (2008) is an ethnography of corporate media,
branding, and advertising in China. It points to the shortcomings in this project and the
value that ethnographic research can contribute to the fields of cultural studies and
identity politics in contemporary China. Wang admits that one of the most challenging
goals of her book was to "move those in the discipline of cultural studies from a focus on
the ad as an authorial "text," flattened out for content analysis, to a focus on the ad as a
"product," an assembly line output whose dynamics can only be capture through onsite
fieldwork" (2008: xi). Wang's mission applies to directly to this study. "This
methodological emphasis [on ethnography]," she argues, "is crucial if we want to explore
the possibilities of moving advertising research and, by extension, pop culture studies in
general beyond the staple question of representation into the domain of cultural
production" (2008: xi).
Wang (2008: 136) cites the ten thematic, emotive meanings of brand China that
Kevin Roberts, CEO of the transnational advertising and branding company Saatchi and
Saatchi, proposed in 1998:
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• Wisdom • Energy
• Mystery • Vitality
• Spirituality • High intelligence
• Harmony • High craft
• Invention • Industriousness
These themes clearly parallel many of the projected national images embedded
within the Olympic visual narrative described in this project. Yet, Wang points out that
many of the suggested images for brand China simply do not match the reality of Chinese
culture, nor have they ever. "Harmony?" she asks. "This Taoist value was never really
prevalent in China even in imperial times" (2008: 137). She considers the images on the
right to be "a cluster of contemporary virtues which, in Roberts's mind, justifies the rise
of China as the most exciting emerging market in the world" (137). Robert's list suggests
another example of how ethnographic research into contemporary identity politics in
China might explore the lines of thought opened up in this project. Ethnography would
be well suited to investigate how average Chinese understand their "Chineseness" and
could therefore test the relevancy or accuracy ofthe projected national images suggested
in this project. Fieldwork that investigates the cultural production of brand China would
support my underlying argument that the socially constructed nature of brand China
makes it an invented tradition very much in the same category as national identity.
It is also important to keep in mind that the visual narrative constructed for the
Olympics has different meanings depending on the audience doing the looking. This
relates back to ling Wang's admonition not to consider one's data-be it visual or
otherwise-in isolation from the cultural contexts of its production. China's external
image building and nation branding efforts must be considered in light of the overarching
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priority of the Party to maintain its intemallegitimacy, and future research would
investigate this more fully. In terms of foreign policy, future research might follow
Wang Hongying's (2003) analysis of image building and Chinese foreign policy behavior
by testing to see if the images and themes underlying the visual narrative of the 2008
Beijing Olympics have a constraining or constitutive impact on both China's domestic
and foreign policy behaviors.
Finally, one of the most interesting possibilities for future research would be to
more thoroughly problematize the role of images and representation in contemporary
social life-particularly in China's booming, post-Mao corporate media and branding
industries. This line of research relates back to Guy Debord's (1967) Society ofthe
Spectacle, quoted at the beginning of this paper, and the "economy of appearances"
referenced in Chapter I. Debord's concept of spectacle as a distinct mode of ecnonomic
organization cannot be understood solely in terms of mass media saturation or even
grandiose displays of cultural performance such as occur during the Olympics. To
Debord, the spectacle is a totalizing discourse, and as such the spectacle not only
structures but completely obscures how knowledge and class consciousness are socially
constructed. "The spectacle is not a collection of images," explained Debord, but rather
is "a social relation among people, mediated by images" (1977[1967]: thesis 4). It is in
this way that the "society of the spectacle" relates to the "economy of appearances": both
are predicated upon image and representation serving as social mediaries. "Considered in
its own terms," Debord wrote, "the spectacle is affirmation of appearance and affirmation
of all human life, namely social life, as mere appearance" (1977[1967]: thesis 10). This
raises the question: If, in the spectacle, "that which is good appears, and that which
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appears is good" (Debord 1977[1967]: thesis 5), then what happens to identities and
histories that are silenced or erased from the spectacular discourse, such as China's
migrant labor population, the urban poor, ethnic Uyghurs, or Chinese homosexuals?
Furthermore, thinking about the relationship between Debord's spectacle and the
"spectacle" of the Olympics as a visually mediated international sports mega-event
suggests a role for more robust application of theories of visual communication in the
projection of national images. The complex web of relationships between visuality and
visual communication in postmodern societies, the "economy of appearances" and urban
image construction (and the socio-spatial transformations such image construction
campaigns typically signifY), and Debord's concept of the spectacle suggests possibilities
to understand how concern for image, representation, and visual sensations impact the
social construction of everyday life-or even, in the case of staging mega-events, the
impact of visual representations of national identity on foreign policy and international
relations. Again, visual ethnography would seem well-suited to take up the task of this
line of research.
Final Remarks
My research indicates that Party leadership was acutely aware of the brand
marketing potential of the Olympics and consciously designed images and visual
elements that would suggest alternative, more positive images about China-and thereby
reposition brand China in the nation brand marketplace. The semiotic-discourse analysis
above revealed the projected national images embedded in the visual narrative for the
Beijing Olympics: China is open and receptive (e.g., the open and porous design of the
Bird's Nest stadium); China is "lifting off' and rising up (like a bird); China is whimsical
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and soft (e.g., the "bubbles" of the Water Cube, thefuwa mascots); China is graceful,
ancient, and wise (the calligraphic rendering of the dancing figure stylized in the Olympic
emblem, which is also the character *jlng, Mandarin for "capital"); China is innovative
and new (especially in the high-tech architecture epitomized by Olympic venues such as
the Bird's Nest and Water Cube); China is an environmentally friendly power (alternative
energies, the "greening" of Beijing, shutting down factories before and during the
Games); and perhaps most interestingly, that dan and duilian are essential concepts in
Chinese culture and, as Ramo argues, should therefore be emphasized when considering
the cleavages and contradictions in contemporary Chinese society. Such are the images
and themes projected in the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics.
The Beijing Olympics provided the Party with a global platform on which to
visually represent Chinese national identity and configure brand China in terms of the
above mentioned projected national images. Following Joshua Ramo, "brand China" is a
useful metaphor that captures the importance of political credibility and the value that
newness and innovation (as well as the harmonizing principle embodied in dan 1!1?) may
bring to brand China's global reputation.
In order to consider more fully the role that visual representations of Chinese
national identity played in marketing brand China, I adopted a nation branding point of
view and brought the ANBI hexagon to bear on the elements of the Olympic visual
narrative considered in this project. This allowed a framework in which to situate the
different elements of the Party's Olympic imagery and to consider, using the vocabulary
of nation branding, how the Olympics may improve brand China's reputation in the
international community.
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I utilized instrumentalist and constructivist theories from identity politics to argue
that, as with Fabienne Darling-Wolfs conclusion about the function of the visual
narrative surrounding the 2002 Tokyo World Cup, the emotive and symbolic content of
the Party's Olympic imagery positioned China in the Western cultural imaginary as a
whimsical, open, inviting, harmonious, and innovative "rising" power. In short, the
visual imagery from the Beijing Olympics constructed China as a non-threatening and
peaceful country. Many ofthe themes and motifs in the Party's Olympic imagery can be
viewed as direct challenges to the cultural stereotypes and negative images that afflict
China's international reputation.
In order to stress that all countries use the Olympics as an opportunity to do
international image "work" and also to highlight the challenges China faces in its image
"work," I briefly discussed the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. I considered the projected
national images embedded within Barcelona's Olympic imagery, the identity politics that
converged around the Barcelona Games, and the reasons why many observers have
deemed Spain's image building efforts a success. My research supports the conclusion
that the Barcelona Olympics accomplished the image building objectives of the various
interest and identity groups because of the favorable political and historical
circumstances in which Spain found itself. These circumstances are fundamentally
different than those surrounding the Beijing Games.
First, China faces a lingering distrust and anxiety about communism that
Barcelona did not encounter. Second, China faces a hegemony ofmedia discourse that
perpetuates its already negative image by focusing on China's sordid human rights
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records, its difficulties managing the quality control of manufactured goods and in
securing intellectual property rights, and its pollution and environmental degradation.
In the end, the Party's lack of political credibility diminishes the possibility that
the Beijing Olympics will substantially improve China's global image outside of the two
or three areas from the Anholt Nation Brands Index discussed in Chapter IV. It is
possible that the projected national images in the Beijing Olympics will improve brand
China's performance in the exports and investment/immigration categories-but it is too
soon to tell if the Games will improve China's governance rating.
My research describes how the emblems, logos, and venues surrounding the
Beijing Olympics can be considered projected national images that reflect Chinese
history and identity. By looking at the visual narrative surrounding the Beijing Olympics
and by semiotically "reading" the elements in this narrative we learn about Chinese
history and the kinds of images that Party leaders hope the international community
associates with China. Yet, in this project I have pointed out several instances that
implicate the complex identity politics and conflicting interests that characterize the
Party's internal political culture. The Party is not a monolithic block of uniform
identities and interests. These examples revealed the Party's willingness to enlist
Chinese artists and international architecture firms in the production of Olympic imagery
and venues. Han Meilin, the designer of the Olympic emblem and thefuwa mascots,
expressed his dissatisfaction with the Party for what he felt was its micromanagement
over his artistic license; Ai Weiwei, who consulted on the design of the National
Stadium, criticized the Party for using the Olympics to establish tighter controls of media
and social life in China. Furthermore, the visual data assembled above are implicated in
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the social construction of brand China. Although it is beyond the scope of this project to
speculate about whether or not audiences "decoded" (Hall 1980) the narrative elements in
a way that matches the goals and intentions of the Party, their role in the social
construction of brand China is undeniable and suggests a fruitful line of research for
future investigation.
China must now embark on its next, more challenging period of reform. This
phase requires transforming the image of brand China from the polluted, oppressive
"factory of the world" to an innovative creator of products, brands, and ideas (Ramo
2007: 27). Although it is unlikely that the 2008 Beijing Olympics will usher in sweeping
political reforms-as the 1988 Seoul Olympics did for South Korea-it is likely they will
be remembered as a catalyst inaugurating the next phase of reforms (Black and Bezanson
2004). Will the ideas connoted by China's Olympic visual narrative-China is ancient
and wise; China values harmony, unity, and environmentally friendly development; and
China is new, innovative, and high-tech-be compelling enough to overcome people's
anxieties about China's "peaceful rise"?
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